Introduction
In 1983 Dolev [D] published the following damning result for distributed computing: "Byzantine agreement is achievable only if the number of faulty processors in the system is less than one-half of the connectivity of the system's network." Even in the absence of malicious failures connectivity t + 1 is required to achieve agreement
tHl.
A simple corollary of these results is that in order for a system to be able to reach agreement in the presence of up to t faulty processors, every processor must be directly connected to at least O(t) others. Such high connectivity, while feasible in a small system, cannot be implemented at reasonable cost in a large system.
As technology improves, increasingly large distributed systems and parallel computers will be constructed. However, in any forthcoming technology, the number of faulty processors in a given system will grow with the size of the system, while the degree of the interconnection network by which the processors communicate will, for all practical purposes, remain fixed.
Despite these negative results, distributed systems are widely used and parallel computers are being built. This sugPermission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission. © 1986 ACM 0-89791-193-8/86/0500/0370 $00.75 gests that the correctness conditions for Byzantine agreement are too stringent to reflect practical situations. In particular, Byzantine agreement guarantees coordination among all correct processors, by necessity omitting up to t faulty processors. In many situations it may suffice to guarantee agreement among all but O(t) processors. In other situations a simple majority consensus may suffice. Similarly, in clock synchronization, or in firing squad synchronization, it may suffice for a vast majority of the correct processors to be synchronized.
In the traditiom~l paradigm for distributed computing correctness conditions describe the states of all nonfaulty processors. In this paper we propose a new paradigm for fault-tolerant computing in which correctness conditions are relaxed by "giving up for lost" those correct processors whose communication paths to the remainder of the network are excessively corrupted by faulty processors. Such a processor is called poor. While any network of bounded degree must contain some poor processors, in this paper we show that their number can often be kept quite small, even in networks of constant degree. Further, we argue that this type of cooperation may fit well most applications of, say, Byzantine agreement. All known algorithms guarantee only that if at most t < n/3 processors fail then at least k > n -t processors will mutually agree on a value. Our results show one can eliminate the costly connectivity condition requiring i2(nt) edges by employing an appropriately chosen bounded degree network of n + O(t) processors and still guarantee agreement among n correct processors. Our paradigm admits deterministic solutions in networks of small constant degree to such fundamental problems as atomic broadcast, Byzantine agreement and clock synchronization.
We present a general simulation technique by which for almost any regular graph G, the vertices (processors) of G can simulate an algorithm designed for a complete network in such a way that the number of poor processors in G is small. The crux of the simulation is a transmission scheme for simulating the point to point transmissions of the complete network by sending messages along several paths of G in such a way that there will always be a large set of correct processors capable of communicating among themselves as if they comprise a fully connected subnetwork, independent of the behaviour of the faulty processors.
For consensus problems we can often do better than in the general simulation by employing a compression procedure based on the existence of compressor graphs [P] . This procedure is iterative and local in nature, and cannot by itself guarantee agreement. However, it can be used to "sharpen" dichotomies in that if a sufficiently large majority (e.g., all but O(tlogt)) of the correct processors have the same value, then the procedure converges and strengthens this majority (e.g., to all but t + 1).
For simplicity, in this work we restrict our attention to the following version of Byzantine agreement: Each processor begins with a binary initial value. Eventually all correct processors must irreversibly decide on a common value. If all correct processors begin with the same value then this must be the chosen value. (See [F] for a survey of related problems.)
Since we cannot hope to solve this probIem exactly, we introduce the notion of almost everywhere agreement (denoted a.e.-agreement), in which all but a small number of the correct processors must choose a common decision value.
More precisely, a protocol P is said to achieve t-resilient X-agreement, where X is any term, if in every execution of P in which at most t processors fail, all but X of the correct processors eventually decide on a common value. Moreover, if all the correct processors share the same initial value then that must be the value chosen. Note that the traditional Byzantine agreement problem is just 0-agreement.
A protocol solves a.e.-agreement if it solves X-agreement for some X such that The next theorems describe explicit graphs for which the set of poor processors is small. Finally we present a purely combinatorial characterization of networks which admit p(t)-agreement, for any function p. When p(t) = 0 our characterization coincides exactly with the 2t-I-1-connectivity requirement for the traditional Byzantine agreement cited above [D] .
Simulation Results
In Section 2.1 we describe a general strategy for simulating on one network any algorithm designed for another network, describing what we mean by "simulation". In Section 2.2 we discuss a general scheme for implementing our strategy, and in Section 2.3 we make all of this more concrete by presenting the simulation of a complete network by a butterfly network. In Section 2.4 we show that our general scheme can be implemented on almost all regular graphs of bounded degree. Finally, Section 2.5 briefly discusses our results under more restrictive fault models.
The General Simulation
For simplicity, we take the simulated network to be completely connected. Let A be an algorithm designed for a fully connected network H. Consider an arbitrary network G over the same set of vertices (processors) as in H, and suppose we wish to simulate A on G. We need only specify the simulation of communication between processors; a direct message from a processor u to its neighbor v in H can be simulated in G by sending the message from u to v through various paths, and supplying v with a method for determining the correct value of the message, e.g., by taking the value appearing in the majority of the paths. Taken together, the particular choice of paths and the supplied decision method constitute a transmission scheme. Of course, even if u and v are correct processors the faulty processors may be so placed that all or most of the paths from u to v are corrupted. Thus, even if a processor is correct, it may be unable to properly communicate with the other processors.
Let a transmission scheme for G be fixed. Let T be a subset of the vertices of G (think of T as the set of faulty processors). A pair of nodes (u,v) E G is successful w.r.t. T if, whenever all the processors not in T follow the transmission scheme correctly, the simulation of a message transmission from u to v always succeeds (i.e., v decides correctly on the value sent by u). Let POOR(G, T) be a minimal set of correct nodes s.t. every pair of nodes u, v q~ T n POOR(G, T) is successful w.r.t. T. (Note that this set need not be unique.)
As we will show in Theorem 2.1 there is a p(G, t)-agreement algorithm resilient to t failures for every graph G and suitable choice of t. We are therefore interested in finding graphs G for which p(G, t) is small. Such graphs are the subject of Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
p(G, t) faults, then A(TS) achieves p(G,t)-agreement on G in the presence of up to t faults. |

A Class of Transmission Schemes
We now describe in more detail a specific class of transmission schemes, called three phase transmission schemes. Let G be any network in which we may specify the following sets. For every node v we specify sets of processors r,,(~),rout(v) c V, each of fixed (but not necessarily constant) size s. For each node u in Fi,~(v) CFo,,tCv)) a path from u to v (v to u) is specified. In addition, for each ordered pair of nodes ( u, v) we specify s vertex-disjoint paths from FoutCu) to Fin(V).
The transmission of a message x from u to v consists of three phases. In the first phase the message is broadcast from u to every node in rout (u) through the specified paths. (Those processors in Four(u) whose path from u contains faults may have received an incorrect version of the message, or nothing at all.) In the second phase the s (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message are sent along the vertex-disjoint paths from rou,(u) to r,.(v). In the third phase these (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message are routed to v along the specified paths from Fi,~(v) to v. Thus, v receives s (possibly corrupted) copies of u's message. Finally, v takes the value appearing in the majority of the copies that arrived to be the actual message. Clearly, v could be making a mistake, even if it is a correct processor.
Let T be some set of nodes on the network (again, think of T as the set of faulty processors). A node u is said to be outbad w.r.t. T if at least 1/8 of the specified paths to rout(u) contain a vertex in T. Intuitively, if T is the set of faulty processors and u is out-bad w.r.t. T, then at least 1/8 of the processors in rout(u) may receive a corrupted version of the message z. Similarly we say v is in-bad w.r.t. T if at least 1/8 of the paths from Fin(v) to v pass through some node of T. Let BAD (G,T) be the set of nodes in the network G which are (either out-or in-) bad w.r.t.T. Let
b(G,t) = max{I BAD(G,T) I s.t. T C V, I
T ]= t}. The next claim bounds the number of poor processors in terms of the number of bad processors.
Claim 2.2: Let s be the size of the sets r. For all t < s/4, p(G,t) _< bCG, t ). I
Remark: It will sometimes be necessary to consider a more relaxed type of three phase transmission scheme in which each node v e (Four(u) U Fi,~(w)) may appear on at most two of the paths between these two sets (once as an endpoint and at most once more as an intermediate node). The paths have to remain otherwise disjoint. For such a scheme one can prove that if s is the size of the sets F, then for all t < s/8, p (G,t) _< b(G,t) .
Simulation of a Complete Network on the Butterfly
In this section we show how to simulate a complete network on a simple degree 4 network known as the butterfly [U]. All we have to do is specify a transmission scheme. This is done losing at most O(t log t) processors in the presence of t faults (i.e., at most O(t log t) processors will be bad as defined in Section 2.2). To do this we need only specify the outand in-sets and the three sets of paths. All messages are sent only through forward links (i.e., from a node (c,k) to a node ((c + 1)(modm),l) but not in the other direction).
We The third phase paths from Fin(u) to u are defined in a way similar to the first phase paths, using the dual trees based on the backward edges. More specifically, the path from a node (c, k) is directed to its neighbour ((c+ 1)(modm),l) with the cth bit of t matching that of j. This completes the description of a three phase transmission scheme for the butterfly network. We now analyze the resiliency of this scheme.
Claim 2.3: b(Gm,t) E O(tlogt).
Proof: : Let us measure the amount of "damage" that a faulty processor p can cause to correct senders in the first phase. Keeping p fixed and looking at all possible senders u whose paths to Four (u) contain p we see that p can block at most 1 2-7 of the outbound paths for its 2' "distance i" neighbours. Summing up to distance log 16f, the total damage caused by t faulty processors (measured in "number of dominated paths", or "number of destroyed 1 4 ~ _~....k_ 2log 16t __1 __ copies") is t(2~ + 2Zo, re, )2 m = flog 16t2 ra. The number of nodes that might lose 1/16 or more of their paths due to interruptions of distance log 16t or less is therefore bounded by t log 16t 2" 16t log 16t. Finally, we can show that for any processor u, if less than 1/16 of the paths from u to rout(u) contain a faulty processor at distance log 16f or less from u then u cannot be out-bad.
This implies that the number of out-bad nodes is also bounded by 16f log 16t. The analysis for the in-bad nodes is identical. Thus, The next claim shows that this bound on a.e.-agreement is optimal for the butterfly network. Claim 2.6: p(Gm, t) E ~(t log f).
b(Gm,t) _<
Proof: Given t, let k = [log t], and choose
the faulty nodes to be {(i,1) Ii = 0, 1, j = 0,...,2 k-l -1}. This choice completely disconnects the set of nodes {(a, b)[ 2k-l 1},whichis i = 0,..., k-1,j = 0,..., of size _> f log t, from the remainder of the network. II
Almost All Regular Graphs Have Good Transmission Schemes
Let H(r, n) be the set of regular graphs of degree r and size n. Let h (r,n) Henceforth all logarithms are to the base r -2 unless explicitly noted.
Claim 2.8: For every 9raph G in Her, n), if G has the expansion and superconcentration properties, then there exists a three phase transmission scheme for G s.t. peG, t) E octt+6logt
) fort E OCnt-'), for some 0 < 6 < e< 1, E= eCr), where E~O as r"~ oo.
Proof:
Let d = [log t 1 and let 6 = log( r-1 ~_~). ri.cu) = ro.,(u) to be an s = 9(r-2) a <_ an element subset of D{u). This leaves us free to use the same inbound paths as outbound paths. Specifically, we choose an arbitrary breadth first search tree of G rooted at u, and use its branches to define paths between u and the elements of F(u). Finally, by the superconcentration property there are s "almost vertex disjoint" paths between roy ) and row) for every two nodes v, w of G. For each pair of nodes we specify a particular such set of paths. This completes the specification of the transmission scheme. A careful analysis yields that bCG, t) <
Finally note that by the Remark following Claim 2.2 and. the fact that s/8 > (r-2) d >_ t, the same bound applies for p(G, t). Note also that this bound limits the results to t E O(n 1-c) for an appropriate 6 < e < 1.
!
Corollary 2.9: For every r _> 4 almost every r-regular graph has a t-resilient
O(t 1+6 logt)-agreement algorithm, for t E
O(nt-~), for some 0 < 6 < e < 1. |
Results for l~anlts of Restricted
Severity
In this section we briefly mention our resuits for the failstop, omission, and authenticated Byzantine models. As with the unrestricted Byzantine failures (without authentication) our approach is to devise an appropriate transmission scheme. However, in the failure models considered here two correct processors can communicate provided they are connected by even one uncorrupted path. Thus the poor processors will be only those completely disconnected from the major portion of the graph. Now, if a graph has good expansion properties, then it is impossible for t processors to disconnect more than O(t) processors. Combining this with the fact that almost all regular graphs of degree at least 4 enjoy such properties, we obtain the following result. 
Byzantine Agreement on Compressor Graphs
Until this point we have considered only techniques based on simulations of complete-network algorithms on our bounded degree networks. A different approach to reaching agreement in a bounded degree network can be based on distributed protocols of a local nature. In this section we consider such an approach and analyze its behaviour on a compressor graph.
A graph G is a compressor if there exists a constant 0 < 1 such that for every subset of vertices U of size I U I_< On, the set {v I v has at least half of its neighbours in U) has cardinality at most ~ An explicit 2 ' construction of compressors of a (very high) fixed degree (about 817 ) is shown by Pippenger [P] . Using a recent result of Lubotsky, Phillips and Sarnak [LPS] the degree of explicitly constructed compressors can be reduced to about 64. Our interest in compressors follows from our ability to use the compression property to "sharpen" a.e.-agreement to achieve O(t)-agreement (which is asymptotically optimal, as t faults can always completely disconnect O(t) correct processors). Ultimately, our approach will be to use one of the simulation techniques of the previous section to obtain p(G, t)-agreement and then to sharpen this to O(t)-agreement by using the compression property.
The compression procedure is based on simple rounds of the following form. In every round, every correct processor 1. sends its value to all its neighbours, 2. receives the values of all its neighbours, and 3. chooses as its new value the value held by a majority of its neighbors.
The procedure terminates after some fixed number of rounds.
Let G = (V, E) be a compressor of size n, and let t _< -q~. Combining this with the transmission schemes described in Section 2.4, we get
Corollary 3.3:
For every r >_ 7, hCr, n)(! -OCn-l)) of the hC,',n ) r-regular On a complete network, t-resilient agreen In ment protocols exist for all t < ~. contrast, our previous algorithms can tolerate only O(i~L ) failures. The situation for higher values of t on bounded degree networks remains open. In this section we present an approach for reaching agreement on networks of unbounded degree, which is nevertheless much lower than n or t. Proof: For simplicity, we discuss only the case ~ = 1/2. Let G = (V,E) be defined as follows. V contains n = m 2 nodes, partitioned into m pairwise disjoint committees Ai, 1 < i <_ m, each of size m. Each committee forms a clique. In addition, every two committees Ai and A.f are connected by m edges which form a matching between them. On top of that, we optionally add edges so as to make the graph into a compressor. As discussed earlier, this property can be achieved by a bounded degre ~ graph, so the degree of the resulting graph will be Let P be any t-resilient protocol for the traditional Byzantine agreement problem on a complete network [DFFLS, PSL] .
The algorithm we give consists of two main stages plus an additional optional stage which uses the compressor edges. In the first stage, each committee privately runs P (appropriately scaled) among its own members. We say a committee is good if fewer than 1/4 of its members are faulty. Clearly the good committees will reach agreement among themselves. In the next stage, each committee acts as a single processor and the whole graph is viewed as a clique of m (composite) processors which simulate an execution of P. The final optional stage is a compression step, as described in Section 3.
The communication between committees is performed by a special protocol which guarantees that processors within a good committee behave uniformly. According to this protocol a committee A sends a message x to B as follows. Every processor in A sends x to its neighbour in B. Every node in B now executes the following:
1. Exchanges with all other processors in B the value received from A; 2. Adopts as its updated value of x that message received from the majority of the nodes in B (ties are broken arbitrarily).
Finally, the nodes of B run P on the adopted values for x. The value agreed upon by the end of the run is taken to be the message sent by A.
An analysis of the behaviour of this algorithm shows the following:
(1) If t < n/12 then in the end of the basic main algorithm (without the final compression step), agreement will be reached between most of the good processors; at most 3t good processors will reach a wrong decision.
(2) If t < ~ then in the end of the algorithm (with the final compression step), agreement will be reached between most of the good processors; at most t+ 1 good pro-cessors will reach a wrong decision.
This algorithm can be naturally extended for graphs of degree O(n l/k) for k = 3, 4, ..., by dividing the graph into committees of committees of committees etc., with an appropriate definition of a good committee on every level. |
Combinatorial Characterization of Fault-Tolerant Networks
As mentioned above, there is a necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be t-resilient in terms of the combinatorial properties of its communication graph. In this section we derive a combinatorial characterization of graphs that admit p(t)-agreement.
For any agreement protocol P let P(T) be any maximal set of correct processors that always reach agreement under the protocol P, independent of the behavior of the processors in T (thought of as faulty). 
Proof:
(sketch) To prove necessity, we
show that if there exist sets Ti and T i which jointly (but not individually) can disconnect correct processors u and v, then there exist two scenarios, indistinguishable to v, such that in one scenario Ti is faulty and u decides on a value a, while in the second scenario Tj is faulty and u decides on a value b. We prove sufficiency by constructing an algorithm with the desired properties. We briefly describe a few points of our construction.
A processor u transmits a message to v by sending it along all simple paths from u to v. As the message passes from site to site, each processor appends the name of the processor from which the message was received. Thus, a message that passes through faulty processors contains the name of at least one such processor (the last one). The processor v searches for a set Ti such that all the messages not passing through this set are consistent and both u and v are in A(Ti). Let T be the set of faulty processors in a particular execution of our algorithm. If u and v are in A(T) then v will try this set and extract the correct value. Crucial to our algorithm is that v will never extract an incorrect value. This is because by assumption, for all other relevant sets Tj, T u Tj will not disconnect u from v. Thus, v receives the message via at least one fault-free path. Therefore, the faulty processors can at most create an inconsistent set of values, from which v extracts nothing. | 6. Conclusions and Open Problems.
We propose a new paradigm for fault tolerant computing, in which correctness conditions are relaxed by accepting the loss of a small number of correct processors. This paper concentrates on demonstrating the feasibility of this new approach and its advantages.
In particular, we show that a simple distributed algorithm can achieve agreement among almost all the correct processors in situations where Byzantine agreement is not achievable.
Many problems remain open for further investigation. We mention the following: 1. What is the minimum number of steps and messages required to achieve Xagreement? Can the efficiency of the algorithms presented in this paper be significantly improved?
2. In order to use the transmission schemes described herein the processors must have some knowledge of the topology of the system. The amount of knowledge needed, and how this quantity depends on the types of faults considered, are subjects for further research.
3. Can X-agreement be achieved on a bounded degree network in the presence of more than 1o~ (malicious) faults 7. Note that in this case most of the communication paths between most pairs of processors include at least one faulty processor.
